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Abstract 
Apart from the familiar holdup problem, we investigate another implication of specific 
investment that has not been examined systematically in the literature.  That is, the 
presence of specific investment can make a supplier vulnerable to large negative shocks 
to its customer’s business.  In a theoretical model, we demonstrate that this vulnerability 
causes the supplier to under-invest.  A higher degree of specificity induces the supplier to 
invest more, and it leads to a lower mean and higher volatility in the supplier’s profit.  
Using panel data on over 5000 U.S. firms from 1990 to 2010, our empirical analysis 
shows the prevalence of the supplier vulnerability problem associated with specific 
investment.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Relationship-specific investment is a central element in the theory of the firm.  At the 
core of the theory is the holdup problem, that is, the problem of under-investment caused 
by incomplete contracting and opportunistic behavior.  Voluminous theoretical analyses 
have been conducted to investigate contracts and organizational forms (e.g., vertical 
integration and long-term contracting) that would remedy the holdup problem and 
achieve the optimal level of investment.1  The predictions from many of these theories 
have been tested and received support in the empirical literature.2 
In this paper, we investigate another implication of the specific investment that, to 
our knowledge, has not been examined systematically in this literature.  That is, the 
presence of specific investment can make a supplier vulnerable to large negative shocks 
to its customer’s business.  Consider, for example, a situation where a supplier produces a 
custom-made product for a customer.  If the customer later suffers a large shock that 
renders it incapable of fulfilling its commitment to purchase, the supplier will have to 
either sell its product to another buyer at a substantial discount or make significant 
modifications to the product to fit the needs of an alternative customer.  The higher is the 
degree of asset specificity, the more vulnerable is the supplier to customer-specific risks.  
The empirical relevance of this idea can be illustrated by the example of Getrag 
Transmission Manufacturing, a supplier of automobile transmission systems.  In 
November 2008, Getrag put its unfinished plant in Tipton, Indiana into bankruptcy 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985), MacLeod and Malcomson 
(1993), Hart (1995), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Che and Hausch (1999), Lyon and Rasmusen (2004), 
Schweizer (2006), Stremitzer (2012), and Itoh and Morita (2015).   
2 Contributions to the empirical literature include Monteverde and Teece (1982), Anderson and Schmittlein 
(1984), Joskow (1987), Crocker and Masten, (1988), Leffler and Rucker (1991), Lyons (1994), Saussier 
(2000),  Bandiera, (2007) and Tang (2010).  For an extensive survey, see Macher and Richman (2008).  
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protection, blaming its customer Chrysler’s termination of an exclusive contract (Bennett 
2008).  The Tipton plant, 80% complete, was being built specially to supply Chrysler 
with dual clutch transmissions before Chrysler announced it was terminating the deal 
over financial issues in October 2008.  Subsequently, Chrysler itself filed for bankruptcy 
in 2009.  This example illustrates the devastating effect of a customer-specific shock can 
have on a supplier when substantial specific investments are involved.    
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of the supplier 
vulnerability problem associated with specific investment.  Specifically, we consider the 
following two questions: (1) How does the supplier vulnerability problem affect the level 
of specific investment, and how does it differ from the investment holdup problem?  (2)  
How prevalent is the supplier vulnerability problem in reality?    
To answer the first question, we construct a model of specific investment that 
incorporates both the holdup problem and the supplier vulnerability problem.  In the 
model, a supplier makes a specific investment that, ceteris paribus, increases the value of 
its product to a buyer.  The latter, however, is subject to random shocks.  This creates the 
possibility that the realized value of the product to the buyer may fall below its 
alternative-use value.  We use this model to investigate the impact of asset specificity on 
the supplier’s incentive to invest in the specific asset and on the mean and volatility of the 
supplier’s profit in the presence of the supplier vulnerability problem.    
Our theoretical analysis reveals that in some respects, the supplier vulnerability 
problem has the same qualitative effects as the holdup problem.  Specifically, it causes 
the supplier to under-invest in the specific asset, and a higher degree of specificity 
reduces the supplier’s expected profit.  
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Of more interest are the differences between the supplier vulnerability problem and 
the holdup problem.  With the supplier vulnerability problem, a higher degree of 
specificity increases the volatility of the supplier’s profit, and it induces the supplier to 
increase, rather than decrease, the specific investment. Neither of these properties is 
shared by the holdup problem.  
To answer the second question, we conduct an empirical analysis using panel data on 
U.S. firms from 1990 to 2010.  Note that our theoretical model predicts a positive 
relationship between the volatility of supplier profit and the degree of specificity for the 
supplier vulnerability problem but not for the holdup problem.  This gives us a 
convenient way to test the presence of the supplier vulnerability problem.   
Findings from the empirical analysis confirm the predictions from our theoretical 
model.  Specifically, we find that a higher degree of specificity reduces the level and 
increases the volatility of supplier profit. These relationships are robust to different 
specifications, including different measures of asset specificity and profit, and are 
consistent over different time periods.  These findings, obtained from a large sample of 
more than 5000 firms across over 500 industries in the U.S., suggest that the supplier 
vulnerability problem exists and is quite prevalent.      
In addition to contributing to the academic literature on specific investment, the 
findings from our analysis have practical implications for the management of supplier 
firms.  They suggest that the risks associated with customer-specific investments go 
beyond the familiar investment holdup problem.  When contracting with customers that 
involve specific investments, care should be taken not only to resolve the inefficiencies 
associated with the holdup problem, but also to mitigate the elevated risks to the 
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supplier’s profit. 
This paper is organized as follows.  We conduct the theoretical analysis in section 2, 
and the empirical analysis in section 3.  Section 4 concludes.  
2. Theoretical Model  
2.1 Description of the Model 
We adapt a standard model of specific investment (e.g., Tirole 1988) to incorporate 
supplier vulnerability to customer risks.  Suppose that a buyer, named firm B, procures 0 
or 1 unit of a good from a supplier, named firm S.  Firm S can make an investment that 
increases the value of the good to firm B.  The investment is relationship-specific in the 
sense that firm S would receive a price less than the expected value of the good to firm B 
if firm S sells it in an open market.   
Let I denote the level of investment (measured in the monetary unit) made by firm S.  
For simplicity, we assume that the cost of producing the good itself is 0.   
The value of the good to firm B is represented by 𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀, where 𝜀 is a random 
variable.  We interpret the value of the good as the revenue that firm B can earn from 
using this good in its business.  The investment by firm S increases the value of the good 
to firm B; accordingly, 𝑉′(𝐼) > 0 .  Moreover, we assume that 𝑉(𝐼)  is continuously 
differentiable, bounded above, and satisfies 𝑉(0) > 0, 𝑉′(0) > 1, and 𝑉′′(𝐼) < 0.  The 
last two inequalities imply that the marginal benefit of the first unit of investment exceeds 
its marginal cost, but the investment is subject to diminishing returns.   
The random variable 𝜀 represents the risks in firm B’s business.  The inclusion of the 
random variable enables us to model the idea that the specific investment may make  firm 
S vulnerable to the risks in its customer’s business.  We assume that 𝜀  is uniformly 
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distributed in the interval [−𝛼,𝛼].  This implies that 𝐸(𝜀) = 0 and hence the expected 
value of the good to the seller is 𝑉(𝐼).  The standard deviation of 𝜀 is 𝛼 √3⁄ ; thus a larger 
𝛼 means greater risks in firm B’s business.  
The supplier has the option of selling the good in an open market.  But it would 
receive a price less than 𝑉(𝐼) because the investment is relationship-specific.  We use 
𝑟(𝜓)  to denote this price, where 𝑟′(𝜓) < 0 .  Parameter 𝜓 ∈ [0,1]  is an index that 
measures of the degree of specificity.  A larger 𝜓  represents a higher degree of 
specificity, in which case the supplier would receive a lower price for the good in the 
open market.  Following the literature (e.g., Itoh and Morita 2015), we will also refer to 
𝑟(𝜓) as the alternative-use value of the good.3    
As is standard in this literature, we assume that it is not possible for the two firms to 
write an enforceable contract on the level of specific investment and the firms negotiate 
the price of the good after firm S has made the investment.  This assumption makes it 
possible for firm B to engage in opportunistic behavior, causing the holdup problem.  
Accordingly, Firm S and Firm B play the following two-stage game.  At stage 1, the 
two firms meet and firm S chooses the level of specific investment I without knowing the 
realization of random variable 𝜀.  At stage 2, the value of 𝜀 becomes known to both firms 
and they negotiate the price at which the good is traded, denoted by 𝑝.  Depending on the 
outcome of the negotiation, firm S either sells the good to firm B at price 𝑝 or in the open 
market at price 𝑟(𝜓).    
Recall that the value of the good to firm B is random.  Consequently, 𝑉(𝐼) > 𝑟(𝜓) 
                                                             
3 To simplify presentation, here we assume that 𝑟(𝜓) is independent of the level of specific investment 𝐼.  
In the appendix, we present a more general model in which the alternative-use value is a monotonic 
function of 𝐼, and show that all our theoretical predictions are valid independent of whether 𝐼 has a positive 
or negative effect on the alternative-use value.   
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does not necessarily mean that  𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀 > 𝑟(𝜓) for all realized values of 𝜀 .  If 𝛼  is 
sufficiently large (and hence –𝛼 is sufficiently small), there is a positive probability that 
the value of the good to firm B is lower than the price firm S can receive in the open 
market, i.e., 𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀 < 𝑟(𝜓).     
The negotiation between the two firms is modeled as the generalized Nash 
bargaining problem (Harsanyi and Selton 1972).  If they reach an agreement, firm S earns 
a profit of 𝑝 − 𝐼 and firm B obtains a surplus of 𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀 − 𝑝.  If they fail to reach an 
agreement, firm S sells the good in the open market and receives a profit of 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝐼.  
Firm B does not obtain the good and earns zero surplus.  Note that the supplier’s 
disagreement payoff depends on the degree of specificity 𝜓. 
The generalized Nash bargaining problem can be expressed as: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑝 [𝑝 − 𝐼 − (𝑟(𝜓) − 𝐼)]𝛾[𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀 − 𝑝]1−𝛾,            (1) 
 where 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) measures the relative bargaining power of firm S.  A larger 𝛾 enables 
firm S to receive a larger share of the gain from this transaction.    
We will use this model to investigate the impact of asset specificity on the supplier’s 
incentive to invest in the specific asset and on the mean and volatility of the supplier’s 
profit.  We will consider two factors that may drive these relationships, namely, the 
holdup problem and the supplier vulnerability problem.   
2.2. Efficient Level of Investment 
As the benchmark for later analysis, we start by characterizing the ex ante efficient level 
of investment that maximizes the expected total surplus from the transaction between 
firm S and firm B.  That is, we solve the following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐼 𝐸[𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀 − 𝐼] = 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝐼.    (2) 
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The solution, denoted by 𝐼∗, must satisfy the first-order condition:  
𝑉′(𝐼∗) = 1.                                              (3) 
Equation (3) has the standard interpretation that the marginal benefit of an extra unit of 
investment must equal to its marginal cost.  
2.3 Specific Investment and the Holdup Problem 
Here we analyze the impact of specific investment on the supplier’s profit due to the 
holdup problem.  To do so, we focus on a situation where the potential gain from selling 
to firm B exceeds what firm S can receive from the open market even in the worst-case 
scenario (where 𝜀 = −𝛼), i.e., 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝛼 > 𝑟(𝜓).  Rearranging the inequality, we obtain:  
𝛼 < 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓).          (4) 
The analysis in this section is conducted under the assumption that (4) holds for 𝐼 in 
the relevant range.  This assumption enables us to remove the impact of the supplier’s 
vulnerability to customer risks because (4) implies that the negative shock to firm B’s 
business is never large. The alternative situation, where 𝛼 > 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓) , will be 
considered in the next section.  
Condition (4) ensures that both firms can gain from the transaction for any 
realization of 𝜀 ∈ [−𝛼,𝛼] .  For given values of 𝜀  and 𝐼 , we solve (1) to find the 
negotiated price of the good:  
𝑝𝑁 = 𝛾[𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀] + (1 − 𝛾)𝑟(𝜓).      (5) 
Inequality (4) implies that 𝑝𝑁 > 𝑟(𝜓) for any 𝜀 ≥ −𝛼.  Using (5) we find the profit of 
firm S: 
𝜋𝑆 = 𝑝𝑁 − 𝐼 = 𝛾[𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀] + (1 − 𝛾)𝑟(𝜓) − 𝐼.      (6) 
At stage 1 of the game, firm S chooses the level of investment 𝐼 to maximize its 
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expected profit:    
𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐼 𝐸(𝜋𝑆) = 𝛾𝑉(𝐼) + (1 − 𝛾)𝑟(𝜓) − 𝐼.    (7)  
We use subscript “H” to indicate the equilibrium in this case.  Then the equilibrium level 
of investment, 𝐼𝐻, is determined by the first-order condition: 
𝛾𝑉′(𝐼𝐻) = 1.          (8) 
Condition (8) has the familiar interpretation that the supplier’s marginal revenue of 
investment equals to its marginal cost.  Since 𝛾 ∈ (0, 1), a comparison of (3) and (8) 
yields the standard result: 𝐼𝐻 < 𝐼∗.  In other words, the holdup problem leads to under-
investment.  
Note that (8) does not contain 𝜓.  This implies that the degree of asset specificity has 
no impact on the level of investment chosen by the supplier.  The intuition behind this 
result can be understood by a close examination of the negotiated price given in (5).  
Recall that the degree of specificity influences the supplier’s profit through its 
disagreement payoff 𝑟(𝜓) .  A higher degree of specificity weakens the supplier’s 
bargaining position by reducing its disagreement payoff.  This, as can be seen in (5), 
lowers the price and hence the total revenue the supplier can earn from its investment.  
However, the level of investment is determined by the supplier’s marginal revenue rather 
than total revenue.  From (5) we can see that the marginal revenue of investment is not 
affected by the degree of specificity.   
In addition, from (8) we see that the level of investment is independent of 𝛼.  In other 
words, the volatility in firm B’s revenue does not have any impact on the level of 
investment chosen by the supplier.  This is not surprising given that condition (4) ensures 
that the potential gain from selling to firm B never falls below what firm S can receive 
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from selling in the open market  
Next, we consider how the degree of specificity affects the level and volatility of the 
supplier’s profit.  Let 𝜇 be the mean and 𝜎 the standard deviation of the supplier’s profit.  
Then the equilibrium value of 𝜇  is given by (7) with 𝐼 = 𝐼𝐻 .  Using the envelope 
theorem, we find that 
𝜕𝜇𝐻
𝜕𝜓
= (1 − 𝛾)𝑟′(𝜓) < 0 .               (9) 
That is, a higher degree of specificity reduces the supplier’s expected profit as a result of 
the holdup problem.    
Using (6) and (7) we calculate the variance of the supplier’s profit:  
𝜎𝐻 = �𝐸(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜇𝐻)2 = �𝛾2𝐸(𝜀2) = 𝛾𝛼
√3 ,         (10) 
which is independent of 𝜓.  In other words, the standard deviation of the supplier’s profit 
is not affected by the degree of specificity.  Therefore, the holdup problem associated 
with specificity neither increases, nor decreases, the risk in the supplier’s profit.  
The intuition behind the preceding results can be seen from the negotiated price 
given in (5).  As pointed out earlier, a higher degree of specificity weakens the supplier’s 
bargaining position by reducing its disagreement payoff.  This lowers the price and hence 
the supplier’s expected profit.  Note from (5) that while the degree of specificity changes 
the price level, it has no impact on its variance.  That is why an increase in the degree of 
specificity does not change the standard deviation of the supplier’s profit.   
To summarize the main results obtained so far, we have: 
Proposition 1:  Provided that (4) holds, an increase in the degree of specificity reduces 
the supplier’s expected profit, but has no impact on either the variance of the 
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supplier’s profit or the equilibrium level of specific investment.  
Proof: The results follow from (8) – (10).  QED 
2.3 Specific Investment and the Supplier Vulnerability Problem 
Specific investment can influence the supplier’s profit and its investment via a different 
channel than the holdup problem.  If the customer’s business is subject to large negative 
shocks, this downstream risk may be transmitted upstream to exert a negative impact on 
the supplier’s profit.  A higher degree of specificity makes the supplier more vulnerable to 
such upward transmission of downstream risks. 
To explore the implication of this supplier vulnerability problem, we analyze our 
model under the assumption  
𝛼 > 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓)            (11) 
for 𝐼 in the relevant range.  This assumption implies that the supplier cannot be assured 
that 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝛼 > 𝑟(𝜓).  With a positive probability, the opposite will be true, in which 
case firm B can only afford to pay a price lower than the open market price 𝑟(𝜓).  If that 
happens, the two firms will not be able to reach an agreement and the supplier will sell 
the good in the open market at price 𝑟(𝜓). 
To isolate the effects of the supplier vulnerability problem, we now assume that 
𝛾 = 1.  This removes the impact of the investment holdup problem from our analysis.   
Given (11), the supplier will sell the good to firm B only if the realized value of 𝜀 
satisfies 𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀 ≥ 𝑟(𝜓), i.e., if 𝜀 ≥ −[𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓)].   This implies that, at stage 2 of 
the game, firm S and firm B will be able to negotiate the price in accordance with (5) 
only if 𝜀 ≥ −[𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓)].  If 𝜀 < −[𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓)], on the other hand, they will not be 
able to reach an agreement with regard to the price and firm S will sell the good in the 
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open market at price 𝑟(𝜓) .  Recalling that 𝜀  is uniformly distributed in the interval [−𝛼,𝛼] and 𝛾 = 1, we write the expected value of the supplier’s profit as: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑆) = � 𝑟(𝜓)2𝛼 𝑑𝜀−[𝑉(𝐼)−𝑟(𝜓)]−𝛼 + � 𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀2𝛼𝛼−[𝑉(𝐼)−𝑟(𝜓)] 𝑑𝜀 − 𝐼.            (12) 
At stage 1 of the game, firm S chooses 𝐼 to maximize (12).  We use superscript SV to 
denote the equilibrium in the presence of the supplier vulnerability problem. The 
equilibrium level of investment, denote by 𝐼𝑆𝑉, is determined by the following first-order 
condition: 
𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉)[𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) + 𝛼 − 𝑟(𝜓)]2𝛼 = 1.            (13) 
The left-hand side of (13) represents the supplier’s marginal revenue of investment.  A 
close examination of (13) reveals: 
Proposition 2: Suppose 𝛾 = 1 and the volatility in firm B’s revenue is sufficiently high 
that condition (11) holds.  The equilibrium level of investment is lower than the ex 
ante efficient level, i.e., 𝐼𝑆𝑉 < 𝐼∗.  Furthermore, an increase in the volatility of firm 
B’s revenue reduces the level of investment, i.e., 𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉 𝜕𝛼⁄ < 0.  On the other hand, a 
higher degree of asset specificity raises the level of investment, i.e., 𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉 𝜕𝜓⁄ > 0. 
Proof: Condition (11) implies [𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) + 𝛼 − 𝑟(𝜓)] 2𝛼⁄ < 1.  Hence, the LHS of (13) is 
less than 𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉).  Then (3) and (13) imply that 𝐼𝑆𝑉 < 𝐼∗.  Conducting comparative statics 
on (13), we find:  
𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉
𝜕𝛼
= 𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉)[𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) − 𝑟(𝜓)]2𝛼2[𝜕2𝐸(𝜋𝑆) 𝜕𝐼2⁄ ] < 0,                              (14)  
where 𝜕2𝐸(𝜋𝑆) 𝜕𝐼2⁄ < 0   by the second-order condition of the supplier’s profit-
maximization problem.  On the other hand, it can be shown that:  
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𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉
𝜕𝜓
= 𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉)𝑟′(𝜓)2𝛼[𝜕2𝐸(𝜋𝑆) 𝜕𝐼2⁄ ] > 0,                               (15)  
where 𝑉′(𝐼) > 0, 𝑟′(𝜓) < 0 and 𝜕2𝐸(𝜋𝑆) 𝜕𝐼2⁄ < 0.  QED 
Proposition 2 suggests that the supplier’s vulnerability to the volatility in the 
downstream market causes it to under-invest in the specific asset.  The higher is the 
downstream volatility, the lower is the level of investment.  It is worth emphasizing that 
the under-investment is not caused by the hold-up problem because the assumption 𝛾 = 1 
ensures that the supplier receives the full marginal benefit of the investment as long as the 
good is sold to firm B. 4   The under-investment arises because there is a positive 
probability that the good is sold in an open market rather than to firm B, in which case the 
supplier does not receive the full marginal benefit of the investment.  
The most surprising part of Proposition 2 is that a higher degree of specificity 
induces the supplier to increase the level of investment.  On the surface, an increase in the 
degree of specificity appears to make the supplier more vulnerable to the downstream 
risks.  Hence, one might have expected that the investment would fall with the degree of 
specificity.   
To understand why this result arises, note that a higher degree of specificity reduces 
the alternative-use value 𝑟(𝜓).  This increases the probability that the good will actually 
be sold to firm B.  This, in turn, raises the supplier’s marginal benefit of investment in 
(13).  In other words, while a higher degree of specificity lowers the total benefit that 
firm S receives from the investment, it has an opposite effect on its marginal benefit.   
Turning to the effects of specific investment on the supplier’s profit, we use (12) to 
                                                             
4 We could turn on the effects of the holdup problem by setting 𝛾 < 1 in the analysis. It can be shown that 
this would further reduce the equilibrium level of investment.     
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calculate the mean and standard deviation of its profit and conduct comparative statics 
with respect to the degree of asset specificity.   
Proposition 3:  Suppose 𝛾 = 1 and the volatility in firm B’s revenue is sufficiently high 
that condition (11) holds.  An increase in the degree of specificity reduces the mean 
but increases the standard deviation of the supplier’s profits.  
Proof: We differentiate (12) to find: 
𝜕𝜇𝑆𝑉
𝜕𝜓
= 𝑟′(𝜓)2𝛼 {𝛼 − [𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) − 𝑟(𝜓)]} < 0.         (16) 
The expression for the variance of the supplier’s profit is quite intricate.  To simplify 
presentation, we define 𝑚 ≡ 𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) − 𝑟(𝜓).  Condition (11) then becomes 𝛼 > 𝑚.  It can 
be shown that:   
(𝜎𝑆𝑉)2 = �(𝛼 − 𝑚)(𝛼 + 𝑚)4 + (𝛼 + 𝑚)(𝛼 − 𝑚)432𝛼3 + 𝛼3 + 𝑚36𝛼 − (𝛼 + 𝑚)(𝛼 − 𝑚)38𝛼2 �  .    (17) 
Noting that the value of 𝑚 depends on 𝜓 and 𝐼𝑆𝑉, we differentiate (17) to obtain:  
𝜕(𝜎𝑆𝑉)2
𝜕𝜓
= 𝜕𝜎2
𝜕𝑚
�
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉
𝜕𝜓
+ 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜓
� = (𝛼 − 𝑚)(𝛼 + 𝑚)24𝛼2 �𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉) 𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉𝜕𝜓 − 𝑟′(𝜓)� > 0.  (18) 
QED 
Intuitively, a higher degree of asset specificity lowers the supplier’s expected profit 
because it reduces its revenue in the event of a very bad shock to the customer’s business.  
The volatility in the supplier’s profit, on the other hand, is affected by asset specificity 
through two channels.  First, holding the level of investment 𝐼 constant, a higher degree 
of specificity raises 𝜎 through 𝑟(𝜓).  Recall that the supplier would have to sell the good 
in the open market at the price 𝑟(𝜓) if firm B suffers a very large negative shock (i.e., if 
𝜀 < −[𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) − 𝑟(𝜓)]).  A smaller 𝑟(𝜓) means a lower price for the good in such a 
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situation, thus increasing the standard deviation of the supplier’s profit.  Second, the 
volatility in the supplier’s profit is increased also because a higher degree of specificity 
induces the supplier to boost the level of investment.  The elevated level of investment 
raises the value of 𝑉(𝐼) and hence the maximum price the supplier can receive (recalling 
that 𝛾 = 1  in (5)), but it has no impact on the minimum price 𝑟(𝜓) .  The standard 
deviation of the supplier’s profit is larger as a result.      
2.4 Testable Predictions of the Model 
The empirical question we would like to answer in this paper is: How prevalent is the 
supplier vulnerability problem in reality?  To answer this question, we need to find a way 
to detect the presence of the supplier vulnerability effect.  The results from our theoretical 
analysis imply two potential ways to do this.   
The first way is to estimate the relationship between the degree of specificity and the 
level of specific investment.  A comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 indicates that the 
supplier vulnerability problem is present if we find a positive relationship between these 
two variables.  Implementing this approach, however, is very challenging because data on 
the level of specific investment made by individual firms are difficulty to identify and 
obtain.  
The second way is to estimate the relationship between the degree of specificity and 
the supplier’s profit.  While the holdup problem and the supplier vulnerability problem 
both imply a negative relationship between asset specificity and the expected profit of the 
supplier, they have different implications for the relationship between asset specificity 
and the volatility of the supplier’s profit.  The holdup problem implies 0 correlations 
between the degree of asset specificity and the standard deviation of the supplier’s profit.  
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But a positive correlation is expected if the supplier vulnerability problem is present.   
The data requirement for the implementation of the second approach is much less 
demanding than the first approach. Data on profits of firms are relatively easy to find.  
Taking this into consideration, we conduct an empirical analysis on the relationship 
between asset specificity and the supplier’s profit, with an aim to establish the prevalence 
of the supplier vulnerability effect.     
With this mind, we highlight the following testable predictions from the theoretical 
analysis:  
(1) There is a negative relationship between the degree of specificity and the expected 
profit of the supplier. 
(2) There is a non-negative relationship between the degree of specificity and the 
standard deviation of the supplier’s profit. 
(3) A positive correlation between the degree of specificity and the standard deviation 
of the supplier’s profit, in conjunction with a negative correlation between the 
degree of specificity and the supplier’s expected profit, implies the presence of 
supplier vulnerability problem.  
We test these predictions in the next section.  
3. Empirical Implementation 
3.1 Overview 
To empirically test the theoretical predictions, we estimate two regressions of the 
following form: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑃 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐼 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿 + 𝜖,        (19) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑃 𝑉𝑃𝐿𝑉𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑃𝑉 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑅𝐼 + 𝛿2𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿 + 𝜂,      (20) 
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where PROFIT LEVEL and PROFIT VOLATILITY represent the mean and standard 
deviation of a supplier firm’s future profits, respectively.  Among the right-hand side 
variables in (19) and (20), RSI denotes the degree of specificity, and CONTROL is a 
vector of control variables.  
Our model predictions imply that 𝛽1 < 0 and 𝛿1 ≥ 0.  Moreover, a strictly positive 
𝛿1 would imply the presence of the supplier vulnerability effect.   
Key to our empirical implementation is how to measure the degree of specificity 
(RSI).  Following the literature, we measure asset specificity by two sets of variables: 
R&D intensity of the supplier’s customers, and the intensity of strategic alliances (SAs) 
and joint ventures (JVs) among the supplier’s customers.  We will discuss the rationale 
and construction of these variables below.   
3.2 Data and Measurement  
We estimate (19) and (20) using the data on U.S. firms covered by Compustat and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from 1990 and 2010.  To construct the 
proxies for asset specificity, we obtain the supplier-customer linkage data from the Use 
table of the benchmark input-output (IO) accounts for the US economy provided by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the data on SAs and JVs from the Merger and 
Acquisition database by the Securities Data Company (SDC). 
3.2.1 Asset Specificity  
In our main tests of (19) and (20), we use customer R&D intensity as the measure of 
the degree of specificity (RSI).  Previous studies on transactions cost economics (Armour 
and Teece 1980, Levy 1985, Allen and Phillips 2000) suggest that R&D-intensive 
industries are more likely to create relationship-specific assets and incur complex 
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interstage interdependencies.  Therefore, it is common in the empirical literature on 
transactions cost economics to use R&D intensity as a proxy for asset specificity (Kale 
and Shahrur 2007; Macher and Richman 2008). 
We use the method in Kale and Shahrur (2007) to construct our measure of R&D 
intensity in a supplier’s customers.  Specifically, we measure customer R&D intensity as 
the weighted average of the R&D expenditure intensities in the industries of a supplier 
firm’s customers. The weight represents the importance of the output bought by each 
customer industry in the firm’s total output.   
In our main tests, the customer R&D intensity is calculated using the supplier-
customer linkage at the industry level.  In other words, for supplier firms in industry i, 
their customer R&D intensity is given by the following equation: Customer R&D Intensity = � 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑗 × 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑗
,                             (21) 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑗 is the j
th customer industry’s R&D expenditures divided by its total assets, 
and 𝑅𝑖𝑗 is the percentage of the i
th industry’s output sold to the jth customer industry.  The 
latter measures the importance of the jth customer industry as a buyer of the output of a 
supplier firm in industry 𝑖.  
The advantage of relying on industry-level linkage of customer-supplier relationships 
for the calculations of customer R&D intensity is that it enables us to circumvent the 
limitation imposed by the fact that Compustat only includes major customer identity 
information of a few firms that voluntarily report it since 1997.  This gives us a large 
sample of more than 5000 firms across over 500 industries.  Since one of our goals is to 
test the prevalence of the supplier vulnerability problem, such a large sample is desirable.   
To identify the supplier-customer linkage across industries and the importance of 
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each customer industry to the supplier industry, we rely on the Use table of the 
benchmark input-output (IO) accounts for the US economy.  For each pair of supplier and 
customer industries, the Use table reports an estimate on the dollar value of the supplier 
industry’s output that is used as an input in the production of the customer industry’s 
output.  The Use tables are updated every five years.  Since 1997, benchmark accounts 
are constructed based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
instead of the SIC coding system.  To be consistent across the sample period, we only use 
the NAICS-based Use tables.  In particular, we use the 1997 and 2002 Use tables for the 
sample periods 1990–1999 and 2000-2010, respectively.  
Table 1 lists the top 10 industries with highest and lowest customer R&D intensity. 
Those with highest customer R&D intensity are concentrated in high-tech industries such 
as information and communications technology and electronic engineering.  On the other 
hand, those with lowest customer R&D intensity are concentrated in light or service 
industries such as water supplier facilities, prepared food and social services.  We observe 
a signiﬁcant variation in customer R&D intensity across different industries in the cross 
section, with 8.6% for the highest and close to zero for the lowest. 
3.2.2 Profit level and profit volatility  
Following the empirical literature in finance (Barber and Lyon 1996, Brav, et al. 
2005 and 2008, Booth and Zhou 2013), we use two measures of profit.  The first measure 
is the return on assets (ROA), defined as the operating income before depreciation scaled 
by book value of total assets.  In order to avoid the bias introduced by potential earnings 
manipulations of the accrual-based operating income, we use a second measure that is the 
cash-flow return on assets (CFROA), defined as the operating cash flow scaled by the 
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average of beginning and ending period book value of total assets.  The operating cash 
flow in CFROA is equal to the operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in 
receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in accounts payable, the increase in 
other current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets.  
We calculate the mean of ROA and the mean of CFROA over a five-year period, 
from year 𝑡 + 1 to year 𝑡 + 5, as the proxies for the expected level of profit in year t.  We 
obtain the standard deviations of ROA and CFROA over the same five-year period as the 
proxies for the volatility of profit in year t.  
3.2.3 Control variables 
In our regressions, we control for a set of known determinants of the level and 
volatility of firm profit (see, e.g., Irvine and Pontiff 2009, Booth and Zhou 2013).  They 
include the characteristics of a supplier firm such as firm size, firm R&D level, current 
profitability, asset growth rate, current stock return volatility, and leverage ratio.  We 
calculate firm size as the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value of total assets.  A 
supplier firm’s R&D level is measured by the ratio of its R&D expenses to the book value 
of total assets.  Current profitability is calculated as earnings before interest and taxation 
over the book value of total assets.  Asset growth rate is measured by total assets value 
over its lag value.  Leverage is the ratio of firm long-term debt level to firm market value 
of total assets.  To control for the overall risk of the firm, we use current volatility of 
stock return measured by the standard deviation of a firm’s monthly returns during a one-
year period.  
Moreover, we use industry dummies to control for industry fixed effects associated 
with factors such as cross-industry differences in profit measures and intensity of 
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horizontal competition.  Year dummies are included in the regressions to control for time 
fixed effects.  
3.2.4 Sample construction and summary statistics 
To construct the sample, we use all U.S. ﬁrms covered by Compustat and CRSP from 
1990 to 2010.  We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utility 
firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) because their profit level and risk may be 
largely affected by government regulations rather than market forces.  Our final sample 
covers firms across more than 500 different IO industries and 5000 different firms during 
the sample period.  To ensure that our results are not driven by micro firms, we drop 
those observations with total assets smaller than 10 million dollars.  To reduce the impact 
of outliers, we winsorize other variables at the 1% level.  
Table 2 presents a description of all the variables used in the main tests, and Table 3 
contains summary statistics of the sample. There is substantial variation in customer 
R&D intensity, which increases from 0.004% to 0.082% as the firm moves from the 5th 
percentile point to the 95th percentile point.  Table 4 reports the correlation matrix among 
all variables.  Note that firm expected profit, measured by ROA level and CFROA level, 
is negatively correlated with the degree of specificity, while the profit volatility (ROA 
volatility and CFROA volatility) is positively correlated with the degree of specificity.  
They are consistent with the testable predictions (1) – (3).  
3.3 Empirical Results 
We conduct fixed effects panel regressions to investigate the impact of specific 
investment on the level and volatility of a supplier firm’s profit.  Included in all 
regressions are (two-digit) industry dummies and year dummies to control for fixed 
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effects across industries and time.  For all the regressions, we calculate the standard errors 
by clustering at the firm level to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms.5  
The regression results from our main tests are reported in Table 5.  In columns (1)-
(4), the dependent variable is the expected profit level of a supplier firm measured by its 
ROA level and CFROA level.  We start in column (1) by regressing the firm’s ROA level 
on its customer R&D intensity.  The estimated coefficient of customer R&D intensity is 
negative (-1.218) and significant at the 1% level.  In column (2), we augment the model 
in column (1) by adding controls for additional firm characteristics.  The estimated 
coefficient of customer R&D intensity remains negative (-0.321) and significant at the 
1% level. We use the level of CFROA as the measure of profit in columns (3) and (4), the 
coefficients for customer R&D intensity are consistently negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  These results suggest that a higher degree of specificity 
reduces the expected profit of supplier firms, and they provide empirical support for our 
testable prediction (1).  
In columns (5)-(8), the dependent variable is the standard deviation of a supplier 
firm’s profit, measured by its ROA standard deviation and CFROA standard deviation.  
The estimated coefficients of customer R&D intensity are significantly positive for all 
regressions reported in these columns.  These results provide empirical support for our 
testable prediction (2).  Most importantly, they confirm our testable prediction (3); in 
other words, the positive relationship between the volatility in profits and the degree of 
specificity, in conjunction with the negative relationship between the expected profit and 
the degree of specificity, proves the existence of the supplier vulnerability problem.   
In addition, coefficient estimates of the control variables in Table 5 indicate that 
                                                             
5 We also check the results by clustering errors at industry level and the results are consistent. 
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firms that are larger or are currently more profitable can expect higher and less volatile 
profits in the future.  On the other hand, firms with high growth rates or large current 
volatility in profits will have lower expected level and higher volatility in profit in the 
future.  
3.4 Robustness 
3.4.1 Using customer SA/JV to measure the degree of specificity 
To verify the robustness of our results to the choice of proxy for the degree of 
specificity, we use the strategic alliances and joint ventures (SA/JV) intensity of customer 
firms as an alternative proxy.  It has been recognized in the theoretical literature that 
hybrid forms of organizations such as SAs and JVs can alleviate the holdup problem 
(Macher and Richman 2008).  Moreover, an empirical study by Fee, Hadlock, and 
Thomas (2005) has found that a firm is more likely to establish SAs and JVs with trading 
partners that are expected to undertake relationship-specific investments.  This implies 
that the degree of specificity is likely to be higher if the firm and its trading partners have 
established such arrangements. 
We obtain data on SA/JV transactions during the period 1990-2010 from the Merger 
and Acquisition database provided by the Securities Data Company (SDC).  The database 
contains information about the SIC industries of the participants in the SA/JV deals. 
Using the SIC-based 1992 IO Use tables and the SIC codes of the SA/JV participants, we 
determine whether at least one of the other participants in the SA/JV deal operates in a 
supplier industry.  For each four-digit SIC code industry, we define SA/JV intensity as the 
number of SAs and JVs formed by firms in that industry with firms in a customer 
industry divided by the total number of firms in that industry.   
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In Table 6, we use customer SA/JV intensity as the target variable in the regression 
models.  Columns (1)-(2) show that a firm’s expected profit level decreases as customer 
SA/JV intensity increases, suggesting that a higher degree of specificity reduces the 
future profitability of the supplier firm.  On the other hand, columns (3) and (4) 
demonstrate that the standard deviation of a firm’s future profit rises as customer SA/JV 
intensity increases.  Therefore, our findings regarding the relationships between asset 
specificity and the level and volatility of a firm’s future profit are not restricted to a 
specific measure of the degree of specificity. 
3.4.2 Using alternative IO tables and alternative time periods  
As additional robustness checks, we also estimate our model using alternative IO 
tables and for different time periods.  Specifically, we run three sets of additional tests.  In 
the first set of additional tests, we use the 1992 SIC-based Use table to construct the RSI 
variable for the entire sample period.  Recall that in the main tests we utilize the 1997 and 
2002 Use tables, which are based on the NAICS system, for the sample periods 1990–
1999 and 2000-2010, respectively.     
In the second set of additional tests, we study a longer sample period from 1980 to 
2010.  As there are five IO tables from 1982 to 2002, we construct the RSI variable using 
all these IO tables for firms from 1980 to 2010.  Specifically, we employ the 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1997 and 2002 IO Use tables for the periods 1980-1984, 1985–1989, 1990–1994, 
1995–1999, and 2000-2010, respectively.  
In the third set of additional tests, we further control for the sub-periods by adding a 
dummy variable for every five years to all specifications.  This is done for all three ways 
of matching IO industry information.  
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To conserve space, we do not present the details of all the robustness checks here.  
Instead, we report in Table 7 a set of results that are representative of these robustness 
tests.  Specifically, the results in Table 7 are obtained from the regressions using the SIC-
based IO table updated in 1992 for the sample period from 1990 to 2010.  They show that 
the relationship between the degree of specificity and the level of expected profit is 
negative and statistically significant for both measures of profit, and the relationship 
between the degree of specificity and the volatility of profit is positive for both measures 
of profit and statistically significant for one of the two measures of profit.  While these 
results are not as strong as those in our main tests, they do provide further evidence for 
the presence of the supplier vulnerability problem.  Overall, these additional tests suggest 
that our empirical results are reasonably robust to the use of alternative IO tables and 
different time periods. 
Finally, it is worth reiterating that our empirical results are obtained from a broad 
sample of over 5000 firms across more than 500 different IO industries.  In all the 
specifications discussed above, we have consistently found a negative relationship 
between the degree of specificity and the expected profit, on the one hand, and a positive 
relationship between the degree of specificity and the volatility in profit, on the other 
hand.  Considering the broadness of the sample used in these regressions, we view these 
findings as evidence that the supplier vulnerability problem is prevalent in reality.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature on specific investment by investigating the 
effects of the supplier vulnerability problem.  Using a theoretical model, we have 
demonstrated that this vulnerability causes the supplier to under-invest in the specific 
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asset.  A higher degree of asset specificity reduces the supplier’s expected profit, but it 
also induces the supplier to increase its investment. Moreover, a higher degree of 
specificity leads to higher volatility in the supplier’s profit, a property that distinguishes 
the supplier vulnerability problem from the hold-up problem.  Based on panel data 
covering over 5000 firms in the U.S. from 1990 to 2010, our empirical analysis confirms 
the existence and prevalence of the supplier vulnerability problem associated with 
specific investment.   
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Table 1 Industries with Highest and Lowest Customer Specificity 
This table shows industries with highest extent of customer RSI. Measure of customer RSI is the weighted 
average R&D intensity of all customer industries. R&D intensity of customer industries is defined based on 
the benchmark input-output (IO) accounts for the US economy at the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
website. Panel A shows Top 10 industries with highest average customer RSI over 1990 to 2010. Panel B 
shows Top 10 industries with lowest average customer RSI over 1990 to 2010. 
 
Panel A: Top 10 industries with highest customer specificity 
IO Code Customer R&D Intensity Industry Name 
334113 0.086 Computer terminals and other computer peripheral 
equipment manufacturing                                                                             
334111 0.073 Electronic computer manufacturing                                                                                             
334112 0.071 Computer storage device manufacturing                                                                                         
511200 0.065 Software publishers                                                                                                           
33461A 0.048 Software, audio, and video media reproducing  
334512 0.047 Automatic environmental control manufacturing                                                                                 
334290 0.047 Other communications equipment manufacturing                                                                                  
33441A 0.045 Electronic capacitor, resistor, coil, transformer, and other 
inductor manufacturing                                           
334413 0.044 Semiconductor and related device manufacturing                                                                                
334220 0.044 Broadcast and wireless communications equipment                                                                               
 
Panel B: Top 10 industries with lowest customer specificity 
IO Code Customer R&D Intensity Industry Name 
337920 0.000 Blind and shade manufacturing    
623000 0.000 Nursing and residential care facilities                                                                                       
120209 0.000 Water supply facilities 
315119 0.000 Other hosiery and sock mills 
770900 0.000 Social services, n.e.c. 
331314 0.000 Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum                                                                                   
760206 0.000 Other amusement and recreation services 
339995 0.000 All other miscellaneous manufacturing                                                                                         
360600 0.000 Vitreous china plumbing fixtures 
141200 0.000 Prepared fresh or frozen fish and seafoods 
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Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
The table provides a detailed description of the construction of all of the variables used in the main tests. 
 
Variables Description 
Customer R&D intensity The weighted average R&D intensity of all customers; the weight is 
retrieved from the Use table of the benchmark input-output (IO) accounts 
for the US economy on the Bureau of Economic Analysis website: the 
weight is the percentage of the ith industry’s output that is sold to the jth 
customer industry. 
Size The log value of book value of total assets (at). 
R&D level Firm’s R&D expenses over book value of total assets (xrd/at). 
Current profitability Earnings before interest and taxation over book value of total assets 
(ebit/at). 
Current volatility Standard deviation of a firm’s monthly returns during a year t. 
Asset growth Book value of total assets at year t over its lag value 
Leverage  Long term debt level over firm market value at year t. 
ROA level The mean of ROA during year [t+1, t+5]. 
ROA volatility The standard deviation of ROA during year [t+1, t+5]. 
CFROA level The mean of CFROA during year [t+1, t+5]. 
CFROA volatility The standard deviation of CFROA during year [t+1, t+5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the variables we use in the main tests. The sample covers the period 
1990-2010 and excludes financial institutions (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 
4999) from the sample. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we exclude firms with total assets less than 10 
million. We winsorize all other variables at the 1% level.  
 
Variable Mean Median Std p5 p95 
Customer R&D intensity 0.032 0.023 0.026 0.004 0.082 
Size 5.440 5.185 1.936 2.722 9.061 
R&D level 0.054 0.001 0.106 0.000 0.257 
Current profitability 0.018 0.064 0.192 -0.392 0.225 
Current volatility 0.158 0.134 0.097 0.053 0.352 
Asset growth 0.166 0.061 0.485 -0.301 1.000 
Leverage  0.130 0.064 0.160 0.000 0.478 
ROA volatility 0.055 0.035 0.058 0.009 0.180 
ROA level 0.092 0.115 0.140 -0.200 0.260 
CFROA volatility 0.072 0.054 0.062 0.015 0.198 
CFROA level 0.094 0.111 0.127 -0.158 0.254 
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Table 4: Variable Correlation Matrix 
The table reports the correlations among customer RSI and all other control variables. The sample covers the period 1990-2010 and excludes financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) from the sample.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Customer R&D intensity 1.000           
Size -0.156 1.000          
R&D level 0.423 -0.241 1.000         
Current profitability -0.159 0.249 -0.581 1.000        
Asset growth 0.037 -0.026 -0.025 0.093 1.000       
Current volatility 0.239 -0.343 0.308 -0.366 0.126 1.000      
Leverage  -0.220 0.211 -0.272 0.006 -0.075 -0.075 1.000     
ROA volatility 0.238 -0.349 0.476 -0.428 0.069 0.332 -0.204 1.000    
ROA level -0.225 0.275 -0.524 0.705 -0.064 -0.352 0.113 -0.575 1.000   
CFROA volatility 0.157 -0.337 0.370 -0.386 0.041 0.285 -0.136 0.738 -0.505 1.000  
CFROA level -0.210 0.307 -0.523 0.699 -0.073 -0.350 0.135 -0.528 0.956 -0.453 1.000 
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Table 5: The Impact of Specific Investment on Profit level and Volatility 
This table presents the impact of specific investment, without and with controls, on a firm’s profit level and volatility in the near future. The dependent variables 
are profit level measured by ROA level and CFROA level, and profit volatility measured by ROA standard deviation and CFROA standard deviation. 
Coefficients are estimated by OLS regression. Year fixed-effects and two-digit IO Industry fixed-effects are included for all the regressions. Clustered robust 
standard errors are at firm level and used to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms.  
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Profit level Dependent variable: Profit volatility  
ROA CFROA  ROA CFROA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Customer R&D intensity -1.218*** -0.321*** -0.997*** -0.182*** 0.568*** 0.131*** 0.420*** 0.051* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
Size  0.005***  0.007***  -0.005***  -0.006*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
R&D level  -0.160***  -0.131***  0.141***  0.108*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Current profitability  0.505***  0.484***  -0.074***  -0.084*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Current volatility  -0.076***  -0.066***  0.071***  0.075*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Asset growth  -0.032***  -0.033***  0.007***  0.004*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Leverage  0.030***  0.045***  -0.026***  -0.012*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Constant 0.158*** 0.061*** 0.148*** 0.041*** 0.010 0.058 0.037 0.083 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 42,585 37,339 40,519 35,624 42,585 37,339 40,519 35,624 
R-squared 0.11 0.57 0.09 0.56 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.26 
31 
 
 
Table 6: The Impact of Specific Investment on Profit Level and Volatility  
-Using Customer SA/JV Intensity 
This table presents the impact of a firm’s specific investment measured by customer SA/JV. The dependent variables 
are profit level measured by ROA level and CFROA level, and profit volatility measured by ROA standard deviation 
and CFROA standard deviation. For each 4-digit SIC industry, we define customer SA/JV intensity as the number of 
SAs and JVs formed by firms in that industry with firms in a customer industry divided by the number of firms in 
the industry. Year fixed-effects and two-digit IO Industry fixed-effects are included for all the regressions. Clustered 
robust standard errors are at firm level and used to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms.  
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Profit level Dependent variable: Profit volatility  
ROA CFROA ROA CFROA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customer SA/JV intensity -0.010** -0.000 0.010*** 0.007*** 
 (0.01) (0.96) (0.00) (0.01) 
Size 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D level -0.205*** -0.172*** 0.148*** 0.101*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Current profitability 0.490*** 0.470*** -0.072*** -0.086*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Current volatility -0.085*** -0.072*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset growth -0.032*** -0.033*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leverage 0.027*** 0.041*** -0.028*** -0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.054*** 0.040*** 0.060*** 0.085*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,135 38,200 40,135 38,200 
R-squared 0.55 0.54 0.36 0.25 
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Table 7: The Impact of Customer RSI on Profit level and Volatility 
-Using SIC-based IO Table 
This table presents the impact of a firm’s customer RSI basing on the 1992 SIC-based Use table for the entire 
sample period from 1990 to 2010. Coefficients are estimated by OLS panel regressions. Year fixed-effects and two-
digit IO Industry fixed-effects are included for all the regressions. Clustered robust standard errors are at firm level 
and used to account for within-firm correlation of the error terms.  
 
Variables Dependent variable: Profit level Dependent variable: Profit volatility  
 ROA CFROA ROA CFROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customer R&D intensity -0.299*** -0.265*** 0.011 0.082* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.788) (0.060) 
Size 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D level -0.125*** -0.110*** 0.151*** 0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current profitability 0.495*** 0.465*** -0.063*** -0.084*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current volatility -0.075*** -0.063*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset growth -0.029*** -0.031*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.022*** 0.034*** -0.026*** -0.009** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
Constant 0.118*** 0.110*** 0.058*** 0.092*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38,072 38,072 38,072 38,072 
R-squared 0.55 0.56 0.35 0.27 
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Appendix 
 
A More General Model 
 
Here we present a more general model where the alternative-use value of the good depends on 
both 𝜓 and 𝐼.  Specifically, we augment the alternative-use value function in the main text by 
adding a function of 𝐼, so that the price firm S can receive in the open market becomes: 𝑟(𝜓) +
𝜌(𝐼).   As explained in Itoh and Morita (2015), one can come up with examples where the 
alternative-use value decreases with specific investment and examples where the opposite is true.  
Accordingly, we allow 𝜌(𝐼) to be either monotonically decreasing or monotonically increasing in 
𝐼.  Consistent with the definition of specific investment, we assume that 𝑉′(𝐼) > 𝜌′(𝐼).   This 
assumption is automatically satisfied in the case 𝜌′(𝐼) < 0.  In the case where 𝜌(𝐼) is an 
increasing function, this assumption means that the marginal value of an extra unit of specific 
investment for firm B is larger than the marginal increase in the alternative-use value.  On 𝑟(𝜓), 
We maintain the same assumptions as in the main text.  
Below we prove that all theoretical results in the main text continue to hold in this more 
general model.  To distinguish from the case in the main text, we add a † to indicate the 
equilibrium in this more general model.    
A1. The Holdup Problem 
Condition (4) now becomes 𝛼 < 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝜌(𝐼).  The profit of firm S now becomes: 
𝜋𝑆 = 𝛾[𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀] + (1 − 𝛾)[𝑟(𝜓) + 𝜌(𝐼)] − 𝐼.      (𝑉1) 
Its choice of the specific investment is governed by: 
𝛾𝑉′(𝐼𝐻†) + (1 − 𝛾)𝜌′(𝐼𝐻†) = 1.          (𝑉2) 
The assumption  𝑉′(𝐼) > 𝜌′(𝐼) implies that the LHS of (A2) is less than 𝑉′(𝐼𝐻†).  Then from 
(A2) and (3) we conclude that 𝐼𝐻† < 𝐼∗; that is, firm S under-invests.  Note that (A2) is 
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independent of 𝜓.  Using (A1), we calculate the mean and standard deviation of firm S’s profit, 
and find that 𝜕𝜇 𝜕𝜓⁄  and 𝜎 are the same as (9) and (10).   Therefore, the results in Proposition 1 
continue to hold.  
A2. The Supplier Vulnerability Problem 
Condition (11) now becomes 𝛼 > 𝑉(𝐼) − 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝜌(𝐼).  Given the assumption 𝛾 = 1, the 
expected profit of firm S is: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑆) = � 𝑟(𝜓) + 𝜌(𝐼)2𝛼 𝑑𝜀−[𝑉(𝐼)−𝑟(𝜓)−𝜌(𝐼)]−𝛼 + � 𝑉(𝐼) + 𝜀2𝛼𝛼−[𝑉(𝐼)−𝑟(𝜓)−𝜌(𝐼)] 𝑑𝜀 − 𝐼.         (𝑉3) 
The level of specific investment is determined by the supplier’s first-order condition:  
𝑉′�𝐼𝑆𝑉†��𝑉�𝐼𝑆𝑉†� + 𝛼 − 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝜌(𝐼𝑆𝑉†)� + 𝜌′�𝐼𝑆𝑉†�[𝛼 + 𝑟(𝜓) + 𝜌�𝐼𝑆𝑉†� − 𝑉�𝐼𝑆𝑉†�]2𝛼 = 1.   (𝑉4) 
The assumption  𝑉′(𝐼) > 𝜌′(𝐼) implies that the LHS of (A4) is less than 𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†).  Then from 
(A4) and (3) we conclude that 𝐼𝑆𝑉† < 𝐼∗.   Conducting comparative statics on (A4), we find:  
𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉†
𝜕𝛼
= [𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†) − 𝜌′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†)][𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉†) − 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝜌(𝐼𝑆𝑉†)]2𝛼2[𝜕2𝐸(𝜋𝑆) 𝜕𝐼2⁄ ] < 0;                       (𝑉5) 
𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉†
𝜕𝜓
= [𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†) − 𝜌′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†)]𝑟′(𝜓)2𝛼[𝜕2𝐸(𝜋𝑆) 𝜕𝐼2⁄ ] > 0.                                                  (𝑉6) 
Hence, the results in Proposition 2 remain valid.  
Furthermore, we differentiate (A3) to obtain: 
𝜕𝜇𝑆𝑉†
𝜕𝜓
= 𝑟′(𝜓)2𝛼 {𝛼 − [𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉†) − 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝜌(𝐼𝑆𝑉†)]} < 0.         (𝑉7) 
The variance of the supplier’s profit can be written in the same form as (17) with 𝑚 being revised 
to 𝑚 ≡ 𝑉(𝐼𝑆𝑉) − 𝑟(𝜓) − 𝜌(𝐼𝑆𝑉).   We differentiate it to find:  
𝜕(𝜎𝑆𝑉)2
𝜕𝜓
= (𝛼 − 𝑚)(𝛼 + 𝑚)24𝛼2 �[𝑉′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†) − 𝜌′(𝐼𝑆𝑉†)]𝜕𝐼𝑆𝑉†𝜕𝜓 − 𝑟′(𝜓)� > 0.  (𝑉8) 
Equations (A7) and (A8) confirm Proposition 3.  
